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According to the sensorimotor approach, perception is a form of embodied know-how,
constituted by lawful regularities in the sensorimotor flow or in sensorimotor contingen-
cies (SMCs) in an active and situated agent. Despite the attention that this approach has
attracted, there have been few attempts to define its core concepts formally. In this paper,
we examine the idea of SMCs and argue that its use involves notions that need to be dis-
tinguished. We introduce four distinct kinds of SMCs, which we define operationally.These
are the notions of sensorimotor environment (open-loop motor-induced sensory variations),
sensorimotor habitat (closed-loop sensorimotor trajectories), sensorimotor coordination
(reliable sensorimotor patterns playing a functional role), and sensorimotor strategy (nor-
mative organization of sensorimotor coordinations). We make use of a minimal dynamical
model of visually guided categorization to test the explanatory value of the different kinds
of SMCs. Finally, we discuss the impact of our definitions on the conceptual development
and empirical as well as model-based testing of the claims of the sensorimotor approach.
Keywords: embodied cognition, sensorimotor contingencies, dynamical systems, sensorimotor approach to
perception, minimal cognition
INTRODUCTION
The sensorimotor approach to perception has generated much
interest and debate within cognitive science over the last decade.
Bringing together insights from various disciplines such as theo-
ries of active perception, dynamical systems, ecological psychology,
enactivism, phenomenology, cybernetics, and neuroscience, this
approach is identified with an influential paper by O’Regan and
Noë (2001). In it and in subsequent work, the authors and col-
leagues have made strong claims about the sensorimotor basis
of perceptual experience, namely that both its content and form
(what is perceived and how) are constituted by a know-how of
sensorimotor regularities or sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs).
This perspective rejects the traditional assumption that percep-
tion is fully constituted by computations in the brain. Instead, it
sees the perceiver as an active agent engaging with the world and
perception as intimately linked to skillful action.
In working out the fine-grained details of this idea, different
understandings of the sensorimotor proposal have emerged. In
general, they vary in how the dependencies are established between
both the actual and potential sensorimotor structures that are
available to the active agent (and determined by the agent’s sit-
uation, bodily skills, and history), and the quality and content
of perception. The connection between subpersonal sensorimotor
regularities and the personal experience they constitute is made
by an appeal to linkage phrases such as “mastery of the laws of
SMCs,” “knowledge of SMCs,” or “sensorimotor skill.” For exam-
ple, O’Regan and Noë argue that in order for a person to be
perceptually aware, he must not only have acquired mastery of
SMCs, but also integrate the current exercise of this mastery with
processes of reasoning and action guidance (O’Regan and Noë,
2001, p. 944). Much of how the approach should be interpreted
hinges on how such linkage terms are understood and ultimately
operationalized.
The details of this passage between the subpersonal and per-
sonal levels have been the object of much debate (Hutto, 2005;
Clark, 2006; Roberts, 2009). It is unclear whether the sensorimo-
tor approach should be understood as a radical departure from
traditional computational functionalism or as an enrichment of
it. The debates about how this contentious linkage terminology is
best interpreted will probably continue, but in this paper we want
to draw attention to an important aspect that seems to have been
overlooked in these discussions and in the primary literature: the
notion of SMCs itself.
An examination of this notion is a step prior to resolving the
central issues in ongoing debates. Far from being a straightfor-
ward idea, in this paper we argue that the concept needs a clear
definition and admits several refinements. We identify four dis-
tinct notions of SMCs: sensorimotor environment, sensorimotor
habitat, sensorimotor coordination, and sensorimotor strategies.
We define these concepts operationally, thus filling what we see as
a gap in sensorimotor theory. The four sensorimotor structures
are described using dynamical systems terminology although we
also show that they can be investigated by a variety of methods.
We do not claim that other useful operational definitions are not
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possible, but we think our definitions cover most of the usages we
have identified as intended explicitly or implicitly in the sensori-
motor approach. Then we evaluate the usefulness of these concepts
by applying them to the analysis of a new minimal cognition model
of active categorical perception (following work by Beer and oth-
ers, e.g., Beer, 2003). This achieves the double purpose of testing
the operational character of the proposed ideas and of gaining fur-
ther insight into their relation. Finally, we discuss the theoretical,
empirical, and modeling impact of these four kinds of SMCs.
WHAT EXACTLY IS A SENSORIMOTOR CONTINGENCY?
The idea that sensorimotor regularities play important roles in
perception is not new. Inspired in the work of MacKay (1962),
the notion of SMCs is closely related to concepts such as senso-
rimotor invariants, sensorimotor correlations, and sensorimotor
loops. Among the approaches that directly build upon sensori-
motor dynamics we find: ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979;
Warren, 2006; Turvey, 2007), adaptive behavior dynamical model-
ing (Ashby, 1952; Powers, 1973; Beer, 1990, 1997), autonomous
robotics (Walter, 1953; Braitenberg, 1986; Brooks, 1991) enac-
tive cognitive science (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007; Di
Paolo et al., 2010; Stewart et al., 2011), synergetics, and coordina-
tion dynamics (Kelso, 1995, 2009), sensorimotor constructivism
(Piaget, 1947, 1955), embodied accounts of infant development
(Thelen et al., 1994), experimental work on sensorimotor disrup-
tions (Kohler, 1962, 1964; Taylor, 1962), and sensory substitu-
tion (Bach-y-Rita, 1972; Lenay et al., 1997; Auvray et al., 2007;
Froese et al., 2012), and even some forms of “good old fash-
ion” behaviorism (Hull, 1937, 1943). Philosophical precursors of
SMCs include Dewey’s (1896) critique on the notion of reflex
arc, Husserl’s (1997) phenomenological insights on spatiality, and
Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2012) concept of motor intentionality.
There have been very few attempts to define SMCs for-
mally, a required step for testing the claims of the sensorimotor
approach by means of modeling and empirical work. This situa-
tion is confirmed by the paucity of models examining the main
tenets of the theory. Some of the few existing models are rather
abstract and focus almost exclusively on the problem of extract-
ing the proper dimensionality of the interaction space of an agent
(Philipona et al., 2003; Philipona and O’Regan, 2010). Others focus
more directly on robotic applications and assume a probabilistic,
discrete-time interpretation of SMCs (Maye and Engel, 2011).
The concept of SMCs seems to point in an unproblematic
manner to regularities in the sensorimotor field: predictable or
“lawful” co-variations of sensory stimulation, neural, and motor
activity. For instance, the projection of a horizontal line onto the
retina changes from a straight line to a curved arc as one shifts
the eye’s fixation point from the line itself to points above or
below it. In contrast, if the focus is moved along the line no such
transformation takes place. The geometry of the viewed object,
the morphology of the retina, and the particular movement pat-
tern employed, all determine regularities in sensory stimulation
(O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 941). Such regularities could in prin-
ciple be described if enough detail is known about the sensory
system and environment.
However, what counts as a sensorimotor dependence can
change if we decide to focus on all possible scenarios given the
details of the agent’s sensory and motor systems and its sur-
roundings, or if we study the agent as the partial creator of such
regularities, or if we consider different task-oriented scenarios with
different patterns of saliency. The idea of SMCs also suggests the
relevance of regular structures in these dependencies, but what
counts as regularity can depend on the scale of observation, on
whether we make purely dynamical considerations or whether the
focus is on the functional organization of the task, and so on.
O’Regan and Noë’s original formulation describes SMCs as
follows:
“[. . .] the structure of the rules governing the sensory changes
produced by various motor actions, that is, what we call the
SMCs . . .” (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 941; emphasis in the
original).
The original paper, and the ones that followed it, do not offer more
explicit definitions. We can, however, illustrate the way in which
the concept has been used:
“According to this theory, seeing is a skillful activity whereby
one explores the world, drawing on one’s mastery of the rel-
evant laws of sensorimotor contingency” (O’Regan and Noë,
2001, p. 966).
“Now, perceiving, according to the sensorimotor contin-
gency theory, is an organism’s exploration of the environment
that is mediated by knowledge of SMCs” (Myin and O’Regan,
2002, pp. 33–34).
“(. . .) to see something is to interact with it in a way gov-
erned by the dynamic patterns of sensorimotor contingency
characteristic of vision, while to hear something is to interact
with it in a different way, governed by the different patterns of
sensorimotor contingency characteristic of audition”(Hurley
and Noë, 2003, p. 146).
As we have said above, the precise nature of linkage terms like
“mediation,” “mastery,” etc. is unclear and can generate practical
uncertainty at the time of designing an experiment or modeling the
behavior of a robot. But we also believe that all of this uncertainty
relates to the lack of specificity of the SMCs concept itself.
For instance, the majority of examples of SMCs employed in the
literature, such as the one involving the change in curvature of a
line projected onto the retina as the eye moves, or the lawful change
in the properties of light reflected from an object’s surface as the
observer, the object or the light source move around (O’Regan
and Noë, 2001, p. 942; Philipona and O’Regan, 2006), or the set
of distortions that a shape undergoes as its position relative to the
observer changes (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 942), all have in com-
mon that they describe the static sensory consequences of arbitrary
motor changes, i.e., the immediate, local effect of an agent’s change
from one state to another. Other examples, in contrast, acknowl-
edge the role of the agent’s driven, ongoing engagement with the
environment in the creation of invariant sensorimotor structures.
For example, O’Regan and Noë (2001, p. 956) refer to sensory sub-
stitution experiments by Lenay et al. (1997), in which the distance
of a light source can be estimated using only the vibration cre-
ated in response to a single on-off photo-sensor fixed to the hand.
This is possible only when subjects perform movements along an
arc, such that elbow and shoulder angles covary according to a
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fixed relation, while the light remains fixated. Here, the relevant
contingency is not found in the instantaneous consequences of
arbitrary observer motion, but is rather created through a sensori-
motor engagement that couples specific movement patterns with
sensory feedback. While such examples hint at different possible
interpretations of the notion of sensorimotor contingency, such
differences have so far not been made explicit in the literature.
The usage of the term SMC suggests that there might in fact
be not one, but a range of useful interpretations. SMCs can refer
to the lawful relations between all possible sensory and motor
states, given an environment and a sensorimotor apparatus, but
independently of what the agent is actually doing. It could other-
wise point to a set of specific dynamical structures (e.g., attractors,
metastable regions) in the space describing sensorimotor configu-
rations. Alternatively, they could indicate the correlations and sen-
sorimotor co-variations that arise from the agent’s actual behavior;
and the latter might even break up into different concepts depend-
ing on the level of skill deployed by the agent and the timescale of
interest.
These different forms of dependency on the agent’s body,
internal dynamics, overall cognitive strategy, and skills call for
a disambiguation of the concept of SMCs into distinct workable
notions and an examination of the relations they bear among each
other. These different ideas cover at one end broad descriptions
of all the possible lawful structures that can be identified in an
agent-environment interaction and, at the other, specific forms of
sensorimotor coordination that are strategically deployed by the
agent in a goal-oriented or normative manner.
FOUR KINDS OF SMCs
We can distinguish sensorimotor relations in senses that vary with
the degree of agent-centredness. One possible relation describes
how sensory input changes with induced motor activity in an
open-loop fashion. This depends on the embodiment of the agent
and the environment only, not on what the agent is actually doing.
Another relation looks at co-variations that obtain once the loop
is closed by taking into account the agent’s internal activity and
responsiveness to sensory changes. The next sensorimotor rela-
tion is more specific and looks at the coordination patterns that
contribute to the performance of a task. And finally, another sen-
sorimotor relation indicates how such coordination patterns may
be organized normatively so as to distinguish levels of skilfulness,
efficiency, stability, etc.
One-way to shape these intuitions is to formalize the sen-
sorimotor coupling of an agent with the environment using a
dynamical systems approach. In general, such a system could be
described by the set of equations shown in Figure 1.
The details of these equations depend on the specific model
under consideration and the level of relevant detail. The important
point is that for every agent-environment system we can choose
some variables as describing the environment and some as describ-
ing the agent. For our purposes, the choice is conventional and the
distinctions could be drawn differently depending on the focus of
interest. Here we do not discuss how this and other distinctions
could be drawn as a matter of principle, but accept that in specific
application scenarios they are often unproblematic. In some cases
we may not wish to make explicit, say, sensory activity as a variable
FIGURE 1 | Agent and environment as coupled dynamical systems
described by differential equations. The world is partitioned into
components describing the dynamics of the environment (e), the agent (in
bodily configuration p), and their interaction. The agent is further subdivided
into sensory (s) and motor interfaces (m) as well as its internal state (a). For
further details see text.
of interest but would be happy to describe the agent as a whole
coupled with the environment as a whole (with sensor inputs as
parameters as in, e.g., Beer, 2003). In other cases, depending on
the interest, we may wish to distinguish, as we do in this paper,
between “bodily” variables, including anatomical structures, pos-
ture, sensors, and effectors, and “internal” variables such as those
that could represent neural activity (which arguably are also part
of the body), and so on. It is important that once a distinction
has been drawn, whether by convenience or as a matter of princi-
ple, this distinction should be maintained. As long as this rule is
observed, the following analysis will remain valid.
With these caveats in mind, we describe the environment by a
function E that assigns changes in the value of an environmen-
tal state e to each agent’s body position/configuration p in the
world and takes account also of its own independent dynamics.
The position vector, p, describes in general the whole body con-
figuration of the agent in relation to its environment. Sensors (S)
transform environmental states e (which depend on p), into sen-
sory states s, which in turn modulate the agent’s internal state a.
Motor commands m [i.e., the outflowing (efferent) movement-
producing signals closest to the periphery], which are a function
of the internal state, activate effectors in the agent’s body B that
lead to changes in body configuration p, thereby closing the loop.
The sensor states, s, will normally also be dependent on internal
factors (a) such as neural dynamics. They will also depend on body
configuration (p) although this is already factored in the environ-
mental state e that depends on p – this includes dependencies due
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to displacements of the body as well as active changes introduced
in the environment by the agent1.
Using this abstract formalization of the sensorimotor coupling
we identify four notions of SMCs.
SENSORIMOTOR ENVIRONMENT
As pointed out above,most examples of SMCs in the literature refer
to the instantaneous sensory consequences of arbitrary changes in
perspective or movements in general, without considering how the
movements themselves are related to sensory feedback (i.e., regard-
ing these changes from an open-loop perspective). Movement of
the body leads, for example, to lawful instantaneous changes in
the optic flow on the retina (expanding when moving forward,
contracting when moving backwards, etc.). Equally, rotations of
the head lead to a lawful change in the temporal asynchrony
between sounds received in the left and right ear (O’Regan and
Noë, 2001, p. 941). These lawful relations are independent of how
such movements originate.
We can capture this kind of SMCs by considering how an
agent’s sensor values s change in relation to given motor states
assuming that the motor command m varies freely – in other
words, m is taken as an independent variable, decoupled from
the agent’s internal variables a. The sensorimotor loop is opened
by removing the equation m˙=M (a). This relation can depend
on several environmental and bodily factors – for instance, the
position/configuration p, considered a parameter in this open-
loop version of the model. In the most general terms, this is
expressed as an implicit function involving sensor and motor val-
ues: f(s, m)= 0, where m is the independent variable. In some
cases, this relation can be expressed explicitly as s= g (m). Math-
ematically, relevant aspects of this relationship could be captured,
whenever possible and at least locally, by the partial derivative
∂s/∂m, i.e., the change in sensor values s resulting from changes
in the independent variable m while all other variables are held
constant.
We call this functional relation (f or g ) the Sensorimotor Envi-
ronment, which is specific to agents that share the same sensori-
motor embodiment and external environment, but is independent
of the agent’s internal state and the actual actions it performs.
The SM environment constitutes the set of all possible sensory
dependencies on motor states (s, m) for a particular type of agent
and environment. Whatever specific behavior the agent exhibits,
its sensorimotor projections will always be found within this
set, which constitutes the most abstract sense of sensorimotor
dependencies (and the type most often illustrated in the literature).
1The formalization corresponds to an abstract case. Specific details depend on the
case under consideration: the equations may or may not depend explicitly on time
and they may exhibit different degrees of non-linearity, piecewise, or conditional
functional relations, and dependence on various parameters. Equations are valid
within a timeframe. In a system capable of plastic adaptation, some functions will
change over time. It is possible to formalize some of these changes through the inclu-
sion of rules of plasticity. Other changes are harder to capture, such as the emergence
of new relevant variables through development or during the acquisition of novel
perceptual systems. We want to emphasize that this general formal description is
not necessarily complete, but it is sufficient for our current purposes, and as we shall
see, once introduced, the new kinds of SMCs can be investigated by a range of other
methods that do not demand the level of detail of a full dynamical description.
Identifying the SM environment can be very useful, as we shall
see in the next section. This set will have several properties of
smoothness, dimensionality, and symmetry that constitute the
most general constraints to any actual sensorimotor trajectory for
a given agent, including both successful and unsuccessful strategies
for solving a given task. The properties of the SM environment are
the most general kind of regularities or “laws” of SMCs. They are
shared by all agents with the same bodies in a given environment.
SENSORIMOTOR HABITAT
In contrast to regularities that can be identified in the SM envi-
ronment, some SMCs are created only through specific patterns of
agent-environment interactions, i.e., in the time-extended closed-
loop coupling between motor variations and sensory feedback.
Such is the case, for instance, in the example of minimal sensory
substitution described above, in which the distance of a light source
can be determined only by performing a certain class of arm move-
ments while keeping the light source fixated (Lenay et al., 1997).
Other examples include perceiving the softness of a sponge (which
we will come back to below), or the strategies employed by base-
ball outfielders, who move in such a way as to create and exploit
certain sensorimotor invariants in order to catch fly balls without
having to predict where and when the ball will land (Chapman,
1968; Sugar et al., 2006).
In our formal framework we identify SMCs of this kind with
regularities in how an agent actually “navigates” the SM environ-
ment. We close the loop again and take into account the agent’s
internal state and its influence on the effectors. We define the Sen-
sorimotor Habitat as the set of all sensorimotor trajectories that can
be generated by the closed-loop system, i.e., taking into account
the evolution of the internal states a. This structure describes how
an agent“moves”within the SM environment, the different instan-
taneous tendencies, the regions that are most likely to be visited,
the temporal patterns of these trajectories, and other regularities.
The SM habitat inherits some constraints from the SM environ-
ment but it is likely to be of a higher dimensionality because of
the addition of internal dynamics (and consequently the temporal
dimension). In other words, although the SM environment con-
strains the possible habitats, there are still an infinite number of
ways in which the SM environment can be “inhabited.”
Formally, the SM habitat corresponds to the set of actual senso-
rimotor trajectories traveled by the closed-loop system (equations
in Figure 1) for a range of values of relevant parameters (initial
positions, initial states, environmental parameters, etc.). Whenever
possible, local information about the SM habitat can be captured
by the total derivative ds/dm, using the full set of equations, where
m is not any more a free variable but is constrained by the agent’s
internal states, a, and, needless to say, the coupling of the agent
with its environment. As is the case with the SM environment, the
SM habitat will have certain properties of smoothness, dimension-
ality, topology, and symmetries to which we can now add dynamic
attractors that characterize a particular type of agent and its envi-
ronment. These regularities specify SMCs that take into account
the active engagement of agent and environment.
It is important to note that neither the SM habitat, nor its
properties, can in principle be fully deduced from the SM envi-
ronment. It is true that whatever the SM habitat, its existence
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must be a possibility in the SM environment. And in specific cases
properties of the former might reflect properties of the latter. But
the agent’s internal dynamics also create completely new behav-
ioral constraints and new ways in which sensors and motor can
be coupled in a time-extended manner. A metaphor might be to
think of the SM environment as the room within which a person
is doing some activity. The walls of the room constrain the pos-
sible behaviors but cannot determine whether the person will sit
in meditation, lie down, or do exercise, activities that would be
described by the SM habitat. In other words, the “laws” of the SM
environment constrain but do not fully determine the regularities
of the SM habitat.
SENSORIMOTOR COORDINATION
So far, we have considered the agent outside of any functional
context (task performance, maintaining viability, etc.). Within the
SM habitat we may find certain regularities as we have said. Some
dynamical patterns may be repeated for a large set of parameter
values, there may be (meta)stable trajectories, and even transients
may occur reliably for a set of circumstances, things we would
describe as what an agent normally does. Some such regular pat-
terns are often found to be crucial for task performance in the area
of autonomous robotics (Pfeifer and Scheier, 1997; Beer, 2003).
We call any such reliable or (meta)stable pattern a Sensorimotor
Coordination if it contributes functionally to the performance or
goals of the agent.
For example, the presence or absence, depending on the envi-
ronment, of a stable oscillatory attractor within the SM habitat
could lead the agent to perform a categorical discrimination (see
Beer, 2003, and the example in the next section). Or a correlation
between self-sensed left and right angular velocities of the wheels
in a robot while keeping a proximity sensor activity nearly con-
stant could be used to discriminate between cylinders of a large
or small diameter by indirectly “measuring” their size (Pfeifer and
Scheier, 1997). Or in the now classical example, the softness of
a sponge can be determined by squeezing it between the fingers
(Myin, 2003), the quality of interest resulting from a specific corre-
lation between felt pressure and resistance. All these are cases of SM
coordination, i.e., SMCs described by co-dependencies between s
and m that reliably contribute to functionality.
SM coordination patterns are characterized by a significantly
lower dimensionality than the SM habitat as a whole – they are
specific, often local sensorimotor co-dependencies, SMCs, that are
dynamically organized in time – but they are not necessarily always
(meta)stable. Even transients, as long as they are “used” reliably,
could be explanatorily linked to functionality and so count as SM
coordinations (see next section).
In practical terms, a SM coordination pattern is determined by
a dynamical analysis of the agent within the context of a given task
or performance. It will inherit dynamical constraints from the SM
environment and the SM habitat and in general some of the most
likely candidates will come from regularities in the SM habitat.
However, not all regular patterns in the SM habitat will necessarily
be SM coordinations, as some of them may have no functional
significance.
This qualification allows us to bring some clarity to O’Regan
and Noë’s example of the missile guidance system, of which they
say that it is “‘tuned to’ the SMCs that govern airplane track-
ing,” while an out-of-order missile guidance system is said to only
have “a kind of ineffectual mastery of its SMCs” (O’Regan and
Noë, 2001, p. 943). Within our proposed framework we can avoid
referencing seemingly paradoxical concepts such as “ineffectual
mastery.” A correctly functioning missile, which fulfils the goal
of tracking airplanes, can simply be said to exhibit SM coordi-
nations. An out-of-order missile, in contrast, might still perform
stable trajectories, but if these are not efficacious for the tracking
of airplanes, we do not consider them SM coordinations.
SENSORIMOTOR STRATEGIES
Until now we have described different sensorimotor structures
in terms of their dynamical properties and their functional con-
tribution, but without reference to other normative or adaptive
dimensions, i.e., according to measures of efficiency or level of
skill. The explanatory value of the sensorimotor approach is, how-
ever, often expressed in normative terms such as “being attuned to
SMCs,” possessing “knowledge,” or “skillful mastery” of the laws of
SMCs. Consider for example the discussion by O’Regan and Noë,
2001, p. 942) about congenitally blind people who recover vision
after undergoing a cataract operation. These patients must learn
from scratch different visual attributes (e.g., the changing shapes
of a disk that depend on the subtended angle, which in the case
of normal vision are nevertheless perceived as always belonging to
a disk). Presumably, the lawful covariation of shapes with respect
to eye movements is the same in the case of these patients as in
people with normal vision, i.e., they all share a similar SM environ-
ment. And after some basic training they would also share a similar
structure for the SM habitat and similar patterns of SM coordi-
nation as they learn visual tasks. And yet, for normally sighted
people, visual attributes are deeply ingrained and their perception
is already adjusted to a level of visual performance required by
constraints of speed, efficiency, etc., while for people with recov-
ered vision, the task of learning them to the point they must not
think explicitly about them takes quite some time. This difference
motivates the proposal of a sensorimotor concept able to account
for variations in the larger organization of SM coordination pat-
terns according not yet to a level of mastery or lack thereof, but
more neutrally, to norms in general.
A normative framework involves reference to given criteria that
distinguish or value some possible outcomes above others: a dex-
terous movement vs. a clumsy disaster, achieved know-how vs. lack
of experience, and so on. We are not going to discuss the origins of
such norms here, we will just assume that they exist and that one
can provide some kind of normative gradation, such as efficiency,
fitness, optimality, or even subjective criteria like hedonic value.
Performing a complex task requires various SM coordination
patterns spread out in time, sometimes in sequential order, some-
times in parallel, and involving different action and perceptual
systems. Even if several such combinations may be efficacious,
some may be more efficient than others. Within a normative
framework we can introduce the notion of a Sensorimotor Strategy.
The idea describes an organization of SM coordination patterns
that is regularly used by the agent because it has been evaluated as
preferable (along some relevant normative framework) for achiev-
ing a particular goal. The development or acquisition of a SM
www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 285 | 5
Buhrmann et al. A dynamical systems account of SMCs
strategy describes how an agent becomes attuned to a specific sit-
uation, by selecting and modulating SM coordination patterns in
accordance with relevant norms. The notion corresponds to an
even more agent-centered and history-dependent idea of SMCs
and it seems close to some of the uses of the term that link SMCs
and personal level phenomena.
A discussion of possible interpretations of notions such as
“task,” “goal,” or of the origin of norms is outside the scope and
not the purpose of this paper. Suffice it to say that it does not
matter if one chooses to ground norms in cybernetic ideas about
mechanisms for flexible and robust achievement of final condi-
tions (Rosenblueth et al., 1943); in evolutionary considerations of
how a trait has contributed to a species’ survival (Millikan, 1989);
or in enactive concepts of agency and sense-making (Di Paolo,
2005; Di Paolo et al., 2010), to name but a few. Our distinction
of kinds of SMCs is independent of these considerations and can
be applied once one has settled on a suitable understanding of the
terms in the context of a particular problem case.
The above definitions are operational. However, in practical
cases it is rare to be in possession of all the relevant dynamical
equations. This does not preclude the use of other methods, such as
probabilistic and information-theoretic analyses (see Discussion)
for studying the regularities of the different kinds of SMCs.
Table 1 summarizes the four kinds of SMCs.
AN EXAMPLE
Let us consider how these notions can be applied to Myin’s (2003)
example of perceiving the softness of the sponge by squeezing it
between the fingers. For simplicity we assume that a sponge is being
held between thumb and forefinger, and that the motion is con-
strained to pinching movements. The relevant sensory variables
include the pressure felt on the surface of the skin, proprioception,
and the effort required to maintain a certain grip.
The SM environment describes the sensory consequences of all
possible motor commands. It expresses, for example, how tactile
sensation in each finger is related to pinching movements, and
identifies the positive correlation between sensed pressure and the
closing of the grip. It also captures the fact that tactile sensation
vanishes if the distance between the fingertips is larger than the
sponge, or that greater muscle effort is required to maintain finger
positions as one brings the fingertips together.
The SM habitat can be described only if we know-how the
person will respond to the various sensations, i.e., if we close
the loop. We could assume, for example, that the subject has
the tendency to squeeze the sponge until a given level of resis-
tance is met, at which point the direction of movement is reversed
until a minimum pressure threshold is reached, and the squeez-
ing re-starts. The SM habitat, in this case, exhibits regularities
that reflect the resulting rhythmic pattern and the points of
movement reversal. Note that these features cannot be deduced
from the SM environment, and that the SM habitat in this case
includes not only sensorimotor variables, but also internal vari-
ables that play a role in the generation of the particular behavioral
pattern.
To speak of SM coordination we need to link behavior to a task.
Let us assume that the person wants to discriminate between soft
and hard sponges. One solution to this task relies on the rhyth-
mic pattern just described. Proprioceptive feedback at the high
resistance turning point of the movement indicates how resistant
the sponge is in term of spatial displacement. Small displacements
mean the sponge is hard, and it is softer in the case of larger
displacements. Alternatively, a similar coordination could control
the pressing movement so as to always obtain the same displace-
ment. In this case the pressure sensation would be indicative of
the degree of softness. Both patterns constitute SM coordinations
because they are efficacious for the distinction of soft and hard
sponges. Other types of movements, such as moving the fingers
along the surface of the sponge with minimal pressure, would not
have this property.
The SM coordination patterns described can be enacted in a
variety of ways, all of which will solve the task. Repeated squeezing,
for example, might be helpful in getting a more reliable estimate
of sponginess. How to approach these choices will depend on a
normative framework, e.g., whether the subject cares about speed,
accuracy, efficiency, and so on (imagine the choices faced by a
worker whose daily task is to sort out thousands of sponges into
soft and hard). The way these options are structured determine
the SM strategy.
Table 1 | Summary of sensorimotor structures (SMCs) indicating dependencies on different factors.
Environment Embodiment Internal activity Task Normative framework
SM ENVIRONMENT
The set of sensory states as a function of motor variations
independently of the agent’s internal (e.g., neural) dynamics
X X
SM HABITAT
The set of possible sensorimotor trajectories traveled by a
closed-loop agent for a range of values of relevant parameters
X X X
SM COORDINATION
Individual trajectories within the SM habitat that occur reliably and
contribute functionally to a goal
X X X X
SM STRATEGY
Efficient organizations of SM coordinations developed, acquired or
selected as a consequence of being normatively evaluated
X X X X X
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The example is a good indicator of the insights that may be
gained from unpacking the idea of SMCs into four sensorimotor
concepts. The dependence of the perception of softness on the act
of squeezing the sponge is a good illustration of a strong relation
between perceptual experience and action. And yet to propose
that this relation is one of mastery of sensorimotor laws is too
coarse a statement because, as the example shows, it is not simply
a question of the agent being sensitive to how sensation varies with
movement in general (the SM environment). What matters in this
case is also how these structures can be used to regulate an active
movement pattern (SM habitat). This pattern itself gives rise to
novel regularities, which are possible, but not pre-determined by
the laws of the SM environment, and these regularities can then
be put to the task of discriminating actively according to perceived
softness (SM coordination) and, further on the scale of mastery,
according to other norms of interest (SM strategies). A correct, but
all too broad declaration of dependence of perception on action
has now been unpacked into the finer-grained analysis afforded by
the new distinctions.
A MINIMAL MODEL: CATEGORICAL PERCEPTION
In this section we use a minimal model to illustrate the different
kinds of SMCs proposed and identify the roles they play in the
behavior of an agent engaged in a task. The purpose is to demon-
strate how the concepts can be applied as well as to generate new
insight into their relations. The model is deliberately simple but
not trivial, following the tradition of minimal cognition models
introduced by Beer (1997, 2003) and others (Cliff, 1991; Harvey
et al., 1996). Specifically, we consider a minimal model of active
categorical perception that allows us to illustrate and analyze in
detail the agent’s sensorimotor dynamics. We keep technical details
to a minimum. More information can be found in the Appendix.
In our model, an agent can move along a one-dimensional
environment that contains visual stimuli in the form of two bell-
shaped gradients of different widths (Figure 2). The agent can
sense these shapes via a single distance sensor. The activity of
this sensor increases proportionally to the proximity of the object
directly in front of it. The time-derivative of the sensor signal
serves as input to a small dynamic neural network that delivers
continuous motor commands controlling the agent’s velocity.
The task to be solved by the agent is the discrimination between
wide and narrow shapes, requiring it to move away from the for-
mer, and approach the peak of the latter (this is a continuous
version of the discrete robot task in Maye and Engel, 2011). The
situation is somewhat similar to a blind person exploring different
shapes with the help of a cane only. No instantaneous sensory input
can bear enough information to discriminate one shape from the
other (the height and horizontal positions of the two shapes are
varied such that within each trial they can be distinguished only
by their steepness and horizontal extent). Consequently, an active
sensorimotor strategy is needed. The parameters of the neural
network are artificially evolved such that the agent is able to solve
the discrimination task, and the best solution is analyzed in some
detail in the rest of this section.
RESULTS
The best evolved agent behaviorally distinguishes shapes across
a range of widths and heights (exhibiting generalization with
clear categorical boundaries, see Appendix). In the case of nar-
row shapes the agent approaches at constant velocity and starts
oscillating once in contact with the shape. The pattern is similar
to those found in analogous sensory substitution devices (Froese
et al., 2012). This oscillation is asymmetric, and such that the agent
slowly approaches the peak, close to which it ultimately settles
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FIGURE 2 | Minimal agent and its circular 1-D environment
(horizontal axis). The agent, represented by a big circle, can sense
the normalized proximity s to objects in front of it (narrow or wide
Gaussian shapes of height h and width w). The time-derivative (∆s) of
the sensor signal serves as input to an interneuron (a) of the agent’s
neural network. The interneuron is recurrently connected to itself and
drives the motor neuron m, which controls the agent’s horizontal
velocity.
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with decreased oscillation amplitude. For wider shapes, the initial
approach is identical. But instead of moving in a cyclical fashion
toward the peak, the agent moves away from it.
In what follows we explain how the approach and avoidance
behaviors result from the agent’s sensorimotor coupling with the
environment as described by the different sensorimotor structures
proposed above.
Sensorimotor environment
The sensorimotor environment, to recapitulate, captures prop-
erties of the external environment and the agent’s sensorimotor
interface, without taking into account the agent’s internal dynam-
ics. In Figure 3, we have plotted the change in sensory values
that results from the agent being located at a given position rel-
ative to the center of a shape and having issued a certain motor
command (moving at a certain speed). Since the agent senses the
time-derivative of the height of the gradient at its current position,
a specific change in sensor value is produced for each position and
velocity of the agent. The resulting surfaces shown in Figure 3
(narrow shapes on the left, wide shapes on the right) represent the
agent’s SM environment in that they capture the functional rela-
tion between s and m, i.e., the sensory consequence of performing
an action (moving at velocity v) taking position p as a parameter.
Although the two SM environments present a similar shape,
the shallower gradient (on the right of Figure 3) leads to lower
absolute sensor values. What are the regularities of this surface (its
“laws” of SMCs), and how do they contribute to explaining the
agent’s behavior? It is clear that there are two types of symmetries
in the sensorimotor environment: those reflecting properties of
the external environment, i.e., the bell shapes, and those reflect-
ing the agent’s motor abilities, i.e., the fact that the agent can
move equally both to the left and to the right. As a result, we
notice that sensor values as a function of position and veloc-
ity observe the symmetry S(p, v)= S(−p, −v). Specifically, the
sensorimotor surface features two symmetrically arranged peaks
and troughs that correspond to the points of greatest slope of the
bell shape. These peaks are found at either side of the bell curve
(leading to the first symmetry) and change in sign if the agent’s
velocity changes direction (leading to the second symmetry). The
surface also reflects other general properties of the sensorimotor
coupling, such as the fact that sensor activity is continuous and
smooth.
The structure of the SM environment, in this case for exam-
ple its symmetry, can constrain but does not fully determine the
possible behavioral strategies for solving the task. For example,
without any further knowledge of the agent’s internal structure,
the SM environment predicts – and this has been confirmed – that
if the sign of the motor signal was inverted (effectively exchanging
the left/right directions), then the same discrimination behavior
would be observed, but with the difference that the agent would
now “scan” the shapes on the opposite side of the peak.
The SM environment on its own cannot explain how the agent
achieves the distinction between shallow and steep gradients. If
we look at the agent’s actual trajectories in the two sensorimotor
environments (Figure 4), we can at best come up with heuristic
descriptions of the agent’s behavior that seem to involve differ-
ent types of oscillation between negative and positive sensory
regions. But there is no obvious interpretation at the level of
the SM environment of why the agent follows these particular
trajectories.
For a complete description we need to know how the observed
structures of the SM environment (the symmetries in peaks and
troughs) affect actual behavior.
Sensorimotor habitat
The SM habitat, according to our definition, describes the rela-
tionship between sensor activity and motor commands taking into
account the internal dynamics of the agent. It is the set of all pos-
sible trajectories that the agent takes given a range of boundary
conditions and parameters. If we are dealing with a potentially
complex, non-linear dynamical agent-environment system, pro-
viding a full analytical description of this set may be infeasible.
A typical approach is to adopt a quasi-static method. The idea
here is to treat the variable that links two components of a com-
plex dynamical system, such as the sensor variable in our model,
as a fixed parameter. This removes temporal variation from the
dynamical component of interest, and allows one to calculate its
qualitative behavior (limits sets, attractor basins, etc.) for the given,
FIGURE 3 | SM environment for approach and avoidance conditions: sensory change that results from issuing a motor command that determines
agent velocity at a given position. Slices of this surface along the position dimension correspond to derivatives of the original Gaussian shape (which is not
surprising as the sensor outputs the time-derivative of measures distance). The amplitude of this derivative depends on the agent’s velocity.
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FIGURE 4 | Agent trajectories within the sensorimotor environment
for approach and avoidance conditions. The SM environment is
plotted here as a “top-view” of Figure 3. On a background of gray areas
indicating no sensory change, brighter points correspond to more
positive and darker points to more negative change in sensory value. The
shade of the agent’s actual trajectory changes from white to black as
time progresses. While one can observe oscillations between areas of
positive and negative sensory change on the left, and the lack of this
pattern on the right, the reason for this behavior cannot be deduced from
the SM environment.
now fixed, parameter. In a next step one can then study how the
qualitative behavior changes as the parameter is varied (bifurca-
tion analysis). Together, these two analyses approximately describe
how the overall behavior of the component results from the change
in its qualitative dynamics as the normally time-varying input
changes.
In Figure 5 we show the result of carrying out such analysis
for our model agent, i.e., the qualitative behavior of the agent for
different values of its sensory input. Here, we have determined for
each fixed sensor output (which is given by the surface of the SM
environment as a function of position and motor command), the
steady state of all the agent’s variables, i.e., the state to which the
agent would ultimately converge given enough time (its attrac-
tors). Of these states, we have plotted only the coordinate of the
motor command.
Comparing with Figure 4, we can see that the agent’s inter-
nal structure transforms the four (smooth) peaks and troughs
of the sensorimotor environment into four (discrete) regions of
attraction. The white regions here correspond to positive velocity
attractors, and the black ones to negative velocity attractors. Addi-
tionally, in some regions the system is bistable (gray). In this area,
which attractor the system tends toward depends on the internal
state at the given time.
What are the salient regularities of this attractor landscape?
Firstly, it reflects the same symmetries as the sensorimotor envi-
ronment above, one due to the environment and the other due
to the agent’s motor capabilities. It should be noted that this is
not by necessity. However, the requirements of the task here have
led the agent (or rather the evolutionary algorithm) to preserve in
its internal dynamics those features of the environment that are
necessary for achieving the task.
Secondly, the attractor landscape implements a binary choice.
Depending on whether the sensory values are above or below a
certain value, the system will tend to move in either one or the
other direction (indicated by the arrows in Figure 5). One predic-
tion we can make based on this structure is that since there is no
attractor that would lead to zero velocity, the only way the agent
can stay close to a peak is by using changing sensory inputs to
oscillate back and forth between different attractors. This is what
we observe (Figures 4 and 5). Looking at the agent’s trajectories
within this attractor landscape, one can also explain the difference
between the approach and avoidance behaviors. Even though the
possible steady-state motor outputs are identical in both types of
environment, the regions in which they can be found differ in size
(left and right plots in Figure 5). This results in the initial approach
of the agent toward the shapes being identical. But when faced with
wider shapes this trajectory does not carry the agent as far through
the attractor region as it does for narrow shapes. Therefore, when
the agent leaves the initial attractor region, it manages to enter into
an asymmetric cycle of transitions between the two attractors in
one case (approach), but gets fully captured by one of the attrac-
tors in the other (avoidance). The asymmetry of the oscillating
approach pattern, in turn, can be explained by the difference in
absolute steady-state velocity of the two attractors (approximately
0.6 and−0.2).
From a wider perspective we can therefore say that the agent’s
attunement to the environment and task at hand depends on its
internal structure. The attractor landscape transforms the SM
environment into actions that conform to the achievement of
the task. The attractor landscape, itself modulated by sensory
perturbations, also determines which areas of the sensorimotor
environment the agent will visit and how – in other words, what
we have defined as the SM habitat. For every sensory perturbation
this landscape provides information about which action the agent
will take, and therefore what the following sensory stimulation will
be as a consequence (one can in fact make this relation explicit,
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FIGURE 5 | Attractor landscape of evolved agent in approach and
avoidance conditions. Plotted here is the steady-state motor output
as a function of fixed sensory input resulting from a given motor
command (velocity) at a given position. Black attractor regions
correspond to negative and white regions to positive steady-state
velocities (approximately −0.2 and 0.6, respectively). Gray areas
indicate bistable regimes. Actual trajectories are overlaid and
color-coded according to the attractor the agent moves toward at any
given time. Arrows indicate approximate tendencies of state change for
the different attractor regions.
and express the SM habitat as the sensory consequence of letting
the agent act on a given sensory perturbation for a certain amount
of time, see Appendix).
Sensorimotor coordination
Finally, we show how SM coordination patterns contribute to
task performance. Figure 6 (left) shows a convergence to a lower
dimensional pattern in sensorimotor rates of change for the case
of approaching behavior. This stable lower dimensional pattern is
evidence of a mutual, closed-loop influence between sensory and
motor variables. In other words, this is evidence that motor vari-
ables not only determine sensory patterns, but are themselves not
independent variables. The fact is plainly visible and obvious in
this model, but it remains conceptually crucial in wider discussions
of the sensorimotor approach where often no mention is made of
what determines the motor patterns that affect perception in the
first place.
The particular SM coordination pattern also reinforces a func-
tional relation to the environmental object, in this case, the behav-
ior of staying close to the peak performing an oscillatory scanning
motion. For avoidance (Figure 6 right) this is not the case, as no
stable sensorimotor pattern in relation to the object is required,
just its avoidance. However, according to our definition, and the
fact that this transient behavior obtains reliably in the presence
of wider peaks and that it results in a behavior that contributes
to the desired performance, this also counts as a case of SM
coordination.
For a pattern to count as SM coordination the convergence
to a (meta)stable lower dimensional dynamics or its reliability in
general is necessary but not sufficient. As illustrated in this case,
it is also necessary for this pattern to be functional to the task.
In our simple model, functionality is achieved by establishing an
oscillatory pattern around the right hand side of the narrow peak
and reliably not establishing any stable pattern when the gradient
corresponds to the wider peak.
Another important aspect concerning SM coordination is illus-
trated in the bottom row of Figure 6. This is the fact that SM
patterns do not correspond to, nor are they determined solely
by, endogenous “brain” dynamics. As can be seen in the case
of approach (left), the stable neural pattern cannot be trivially
deduced from features in the agent’s internal state space (limit
sets), or changes therein (bifurcations). Rather, what happens here
is that the agent’s state is always “chasing” one attractor or the
other, without ever being captured. Because the agent’s sensory
input changes as a result of its movements (on the same time
scale as the behavior), so does the asymptotic steady state that
the agent tends to. In other words, the agent is always on a tran-
sient toward an attractor that is regularly changing its position.
Interestingly though, the overall pattern that emerges forms a
stable oscillation, which corresponds to a limit cycle of the coupled
agent-environment system. In other words, the environment plays
as much a part in the creation of the observed SM coordination
pattern as the agent’s internal dynamics.
In summary, the different kinds of SMCs we have introduced
contribute to a full explanation of the observed behavior. SM coor-
dination patterns determine a relation between lower dimensional
reliable trajectories in sensorimotor dynamics and their contribu-
tions to task functionality. The SM habitat establishes the “rules”
that explain the presence of SM coordination by examining the
dynamics of the coupled internal and environmental variables.
And the SM environment establishes the wider constraints to
the SM habitat such as symmetries that depend solely on the
environmental and embodiment structures.
In addition to verifying the fact that the proposed kinds of
SMCs are measurable, the minimal model also highlights some
aspects of the SM structures that are not immediately obvious
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FIGURE 6 | Sensorimotor coordination patterns for approach condition
(left) and avoidance (right). Top row: change in sensory activation (ds/dt) as a
function of change in motor commands (dm/dt) during the agent’s interaction
with the bell shape. After an initial transient, the system settles into a stable
oscillation in the approach but not the avoidance condition. Bottom row: the
same coordination patterns as trajectories in the hidden neuron’s bifurcation
diagram, i.e., in coordinates of sensory input and the hidden neuron’s
steady-state activation y1. The positions of the attractors, i.e., the states to
which the system would settle in the long term, are indicated by solid lines
emanating from the bifurcation points (filled circles). Note that in the case of
approach, the system oscillates back and forth between the two attractors,
while in the case of avoidance it gets eventually captured by one of them.
from their definitions alone. These include the observation that
regularities in one SM structure can be preserved in another if
this helps solving the task even though this need not generally be
the case; the non-reducibility of SMCs to “brain” dynamics alone;
the fact that SM coordination patterns serving different functions
(approach and avoidance) can be implemented in a single, non-
differentiated system (functional but no structural modularity);
and the role of the environment as an equal player in the “selec-
tion” of which SMC to enact at a given time. The model brings
home these subtle aspects of the definitions in a way that would
have been difficult to arrive at otherwise.
The simplicity of the task we have chosen does not permit an
easy illustration of the concept of SM strategy. The model could be
modified to this effect, but the more complex analysis would be less
effective for illustration purposes. A SM strategy entails the organi-
zation of various possible SM coordination patterns according to
goals and norms. This requires a more complex scenario involving
more shapes and more actions with a many-to-one viable or desir-
able relation. Wider norms (e.g., energy efficiency) or more general
longer-term goals – both of which could be externally imposed, for
example,by modifying the fitness function – would help determine
what action to perform on a given object. We expect this process to
happen at higher levels of dynamical modulation. Luckily several
other models illustrate this possibility, and demonstrate a possible
way forward in the modeling of norms and values as grounded in
an agent’s self-maintenance (Di Paolo, 2000; Iizuka and Di Paolo,
2007; Barandiaran and Egbert, 2013). For theoretical discussions
relating norms to enactive accounts of agency compatible with our
use in this text also see (Di Paolo, 2005; Barandiaran and Moreno,
2008; Barandiaran et al., 2009; Di Paolo et al., 2010; Silberstein and
Chemero, 2011).
Even though we have not explicitly illustrated the issue of SM
strategies in our minimal model, this concept is no less impor-
tant. Sensorimotor contingency theory relies heavily on notions
such as mastery, skill, or attunement, which are inherently norma-
tive. The concept of SM strategies allows us to speak about how
we move from SM coordinations to their organization, by pro-
viding a definition of what know-how at the sensorimotor level
could mean.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this text is the clarification of key concepts under-
lying the sensorimotor approach to cognition. As such, we make
no claims as to whether or how this approach is intrinsically
better than others. We only hope to have demonstrated that an
operationalization of the concept of SMC can go some way in
elucidating previously under-emphasized implications of the the-
ory and can encourage progress in debates that might rest on
conflicting interpretations of this concept.
A criticism that could be leveled against our dynamical def-
initions is that their practical application will be severely lim-
ited by the fact that we seldom know all the relevant equations
that govern a cognitive system. This is indeed true if we were
to demand a full dynamical account. Although formulated in
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the language of dynamical systems theory, the four definitions
can be expressed using other methods, like information-theoretic
measures or probabilistic approaches. For instance, in a robot
study, Maye and Engel (2011) describe in probabilistic terms the
transitions between sensed situations and action outcomes of the
closed-loop system, constructing what can be considered slices
through a stochastic SM habitat. Similarly, Schmidt et al. (2012)
have studied the statistical information transfer between the dif-
ferent sensors and motors of a compliant quadruped robot that is
controlled by externally induced (open-loop) leg actuations. Their
approach reveals that directional correlations between sensors and
motors depend on the environment (type of floor surface) and
the body structure (hip actuators driving hip angle sensors in the
same leg). The information extracted from this open-loop test thus
corresponds to the SM environment in the dynamical account.
Lungarella and Sporns (2006) also show that sensorimotor reg-
ularities induced by closed-loop agent-environment interaction
can also be quantified using information theory. They observe
that the structure of information flow in sensorimotor networks
is temporally and spatially specific, dependent upon morphol-
ogy, and modifiable with experience. While thus confirming that
sensorimotor regularities are the result of constraints impinged
at different levels, in this work the authors do not demonstrate
how the overall informational structure observed results from
the separate constraints of the environment, morphology, internal
dynamics, and task demands. That this is possible in principle we
have demonstrated by showing how task-specific SM coordina-
tions are the result of regularities in the SM habitat, which itself is
constrained by features in the SM environment.
Arguably, an interesting aspect of the sensorimotor approach
is its agent-centredness, i.e., taking into consideration the agent’s
embodiment, situatedness, skills, and goals. As suggested, the four
kinds of SMCs can be arranged along a dimension from external to
agent’s perspective of analysis. The SM environment requires for
its definition the least amount of detail about the agent. It corre-
sponds to all agents with similar sensors and effectors in a similar
environment. The SM habitat is more agent-specific and adds
the agent’s internal dynamics and closes the sensorimotor loop.
The SM coordination patterns bring on a particular task-oriented
dimension. And finally, the SM strategies add a normative dimen-
sion with the inclusion of value for the agent (efficiency, degree of
skill, etc.).
In a similar vein, time plays different roles in each of the four
kinds of SMCs. All of the structures can be time-dependent in the
sense that external dependencies on time can alter both the envi-
ronment and the agent (e.g., seasonal rhythms, or the effects of age
and wear). Other than this, the SM environment is “atemporal”: it
describes all possible sensory consequences of freely introducing a
motor change. The SM habitat involves the set of possible trajec-
tories. As such, it provides dynamical information and introduces
notions such as trends, attractor landscapes, oscillations, etc. SM
coordination patterns entail a more “local” element of temporality
than that of dynamical trajectories because they rely on the fine-
grained exercise of specific agent-environment engagements with
the added constraint of contribution to functionality. Elements
of duration, rhythms, etc., become crucial for this contribution;
for instance, oscillatory patterns different from those observed in
our simulated agent around the narrow peak might not contribute
to the task. Finally, SM strategies add to this latter aspect that of
a temporal organization among SM coordination patterns. Effi-
ciency, resilience, or other normative evaluations will be affected
by how patterns are coordinated in time, whether they run in par-
allel or in sequence, whether there are hard deadlines, delays, and
so on.
The definitions also highlight the relevance of the determinants
of action, a question that has been rather absent in the sensorimo-
tor approach. Except for the SM environment, which describes a
dependency of sensory activity on motor changes, the other kinds
of SMCs are strictly speaking sensorimotor co-dependencies, as the
loop is closed. Sensorimotor theory has been formulated in terms
of SMCs, but, lacking a definition, the latter have been almost
exclusively illustrated as one-way sensory dependencies on motor
action (recall the line and retina example). Action has been treated
more or less as a free variable in many of these illustrations. By
this we mean that the appropriate action in a perceptual context is
brought into an explanation of perception as required and with-
out constraint. The squeezing movement of the fingers constitutes
in part the softness of the sponge and the stroking movement of
the hand constitutes the smoothness of the table surface. But what
calls forth these particular movements in each case? Why don’t we
stroke the sponge and squeeze the table? In each case what counts
as appropriate action is in part also constituted by the perceptual
context – i.e., action is perceptually constituted – and this aspect
has been underdeveloped in sensorimotor theory. Except for SM
environment, the other kinds of SMCs revert this situation at the
most basic level by including closed-loop dynamics explicitly.
Putting the accent on this point is relevant for testing the impli-
cations of the approach for novel perceptual situations (including
perceptual augmentation by means of sensorimotor prostheses).
We come to a novel perceptual context for the first time already
equipped with bodily know-how. We do not confront the new sit-
uation in a naïve manner but use our existing skills instead. There
is not only a dependence of perception on motor activity but
also a dependence of bodily movement on proprioception and the
emerging perceptual awareness. This situation can converge into a
stable way of exploring the perceptual situation and the develop-
ment of this stability is what we could call the progressive mastery
of SMCs.
A related point concerns the question of how the kinds of SMCs
can help classify different forms of plasticity that are able to sup-
port the acquisition of novel skills, their progressive mastery, and
their change over time. Plastic reconfigurations can occur at dif-
ferent levels and at once involve all the sensorimotor structures.
However, we can draw some broad distinctions by asking for each
sensorimotor structure, what would be the minimal change nec-
essary for a plastic re-organization to occur (leaving the global
structure of the more general kinds of SMCs intact). This helps
us approximate a ‘hierarchy’ of plasticity going from minimal to
more drastic reconfigurations.
A minimal plastic change in SM strategies would imply the re-
organization of the relation between unchanged SM coordination
patterns. This does not need to involve the acquisition of new SM
coordinations,but simply an adjustment of the strategy with which
they are used. In turn, minimal plastic changes in patterns of SM
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coordination imply only the fine-tuning of dynamical parameters
so as to improve functionality, changing a skill, or learning a new
task. Here, without any major re-organization of the regularities
of the SM habitat, some changes, – e.g., changing the period of an
oscillatory pattern such as those exemplified in our model – can
count as sufficient for a adjusting a SM coordination pattern. Min-
imal plastic changes in SM habitat imply the re-organization of
internal dynamics – e.g., generating novel possibilities for action
and perception – without necessarily altering bodily structures
(e.g., perceptual learning or re-habilitation). In contrast, plastic
changes in the SM environment necessarily imply modifications
to the body, the environment or both. Bodies change over time –
growth, training, injury, incorporation of a prosthesis, aging – and
the conditions of the environmental dynamics change as well.
Such durable changes directly alter the most basic sensorimotor
structure and will likely propagate to all the others.
The four kinds of SMCs can clarify the similarities and dif-
ferences between the sensorimotor approach and ecological psy-
chology (Gibson, 1979). According to the latter a much neglected
constitutive factor of cognition is the structure of the environ-
ment: agents are thought to directly perceive the world by picking
up invariants in the sensory array, i.e., properties that remain con-
stant across transformations produced by self-motion (see e.g.,
Mossio and Taraborelli, 2008). This view thus conceives of a rich
structure arising from the world and the properties of the body –
in our terms, the SM environment – without which we could
not explain the behavior of an agent. The sensorimotor approach
acknowledges the importance of this structure. However, in the
ecological approach, the origin of the particular motor patterns
that bring about the invariant-revealing transformations is consid-
ered irrelevant. This implies that the SM environment is deemed
exhaustive for the constitution of perception. We have seen, how-
ever, that it is actually insufficient. Key regularities are found in the
closed-loop scenario in which the agent’s internal dynamics play
a co-constitutive, irreducible role. These regularities are described
by the SM habitat and, as we have shown, cannot be deduced
from the SM environment alone. In this sense, the sensorimotor
approach, in the interpretation afforded by our SMCs definitions,
presents a more complete picture of perception, because it gives
an account of motor-independent, open-loop sensory invariants
as a special case, but explicitly acknowledges, in addition, the role
of agent-specific, closed-loop sensorimotor invariants.
Can the four kinds of SMCs also throw light on some of the
more general debates mentioned at the beginning regarding the
wider claims about the constitutive role of SMCs know-how? We
think that at least at this stage they can contribute by clarifying
the terms of ongoing discussions such as the nature of the link-
age between subpersonal and personal phenomena, i.e., between
SMCs and perception. As we have mentioned, phrases like “mas-
tery of the laws of SMCs” have been given various, sometimes
conflicting, interpretations. A possible construal is that mastery
consists in the acquisition of knowledge at the personal level
(accessible to action planning) about the nature of subpersonal
processes (SMCs). Now, some argue that the notion of knowledge
in SMC theory should be abandoned, in favor of the idea that the
enactment of SMCs suffices to account for the qualitative differ-
ences in perceptual experiences (Hutto, 2005). Others emphasize
that perceptual experience in the absence of overt movement,
or the perceptual presence of parts of object that are currently
occluded from view, can only be explained by reference to the
deployment of acquired knowledge (Roberts, 2009). What is at
stake between these contrasting views (whether to understand
mastery as enactment or as a form of knowledge) seems to be
the nature of the know-how of sensorimotor regularities that are
not actualized at a given time. How could these virtual regularities
(e.g., the expectation that the rear part of a solid object is also
solid were we to walk around it), inform, let alone constitute, our
current perception?
While not fully resolving this issue, the use of the four kinds of
SMCs in explaining the behavior of our evolved agent may throw
some light on the matter. As our analysis has shown, the behavior of
the agent cannot be predicted from the environment or the senso-
rimotor embodiment alone, but is the result of a coupling between
internal processes and sensorimotor dynamics. This coupling is
what transforms environmental and sensorimotor regularities into
movement tendencies and their sensory consequences. One of the
non-trivial insights provided by the model is that, crucially, there
is nothing in the internal dynamics of the agent’s “brain” that rep-
resents the SMCs that are being enacted or the non-actualized
sensorimotor regularities that still have a dynamical influence (see
our analysis, e.g., Figure 5). Regularities in the dynamical land-
scape certainly exist and have a role in the production of behavior,
but they are demonstrably not internally represented by the agent
in any way. In particular, as should be clear from our analy-
sis, regularities in sensorimotor structures are not determined by
neural network parameters (e.g., connection weights), but rather
co-determined by the agent’s internal structure, its sensorimotor
interfaces, and environmental properties.
Another unexpected insight gained by the analysis in our model
suggests that the question of direct access vs. represented knowl-
edge may rely on false assumptions. These seem to be: (1) only what
happens here-and-now can be accessed directly; and (2) anything
that is accessed about what does not happen here-and-now, must
somehow be “brought” into the here-and-now via representations
(typically some internal register of the past or prediction about
future states). The model shows that the first assumption is mis-
leading and consequently, the second unnecessary. Dynamically,
we should interpret the present sensorimotor state in terms of a
“thick” here-and-now, that is, the current situation is not only the
states that are actualized, but also the virtual traces and tendencies
entailed by them.
As we have seen, strong tendencies defined in the SM habitat
heavily constrain the actual trajectories of the agent (Figure 5).
On the one hand, these tendencies underlie the separation of ini-
tially similar states according to their developmental history. The
current state, in other words, reflects a history of changes that
the system has undergone over time. In this way, the totality of
past events is brought to bear on the current situation. On the
other hand, these tendencies establish bounds on the set of possi-
ble future states. As long as the system does not suffer significant
perturbations the current state entails to some extent the subse-
quent course of events, i.e., the flow of the system toward a specific
subset of its state space.
This“temporal thickness”of dynamical systems has been linked
explicitly with phenomenological investigations of the temporality
of intentionality (van Gelder, 1999; Varela, 1999; Kelly, 2000). We
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can make a similar dynamical interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s
(1945/2012) concept of motor intentionality: in the acquisition of
everyday skills the accumulation of experience serves to discrimi-
nate, with increasing specificity, situations that solicit a particular
response (separation of traces). Experience also allows a person to
incrementally refine her dispositions to respond to these solic-
itations (tuning of tendencies). Merleau-Ponty suggests that a
response to a situation takes the form of movement toward the
completion of a Gestalt (“maximum grip”) or equilibrium to
which the body tends to relax without the need to mentally rep-
resent this optimum (like finding the right distance to admire a
painting).
From this perspective, acquiring sensorimotor skills does not
imply the use of representational knowledge to deal with non-
actualized sensorimotor regularities. It is rather the shaping of
dynamical tendencies that channel appropriate actions on the basis
of past experience and in accordance with goals. Mastery, in this
dynamical view, would be a measure of how, through the course of
development and skill acquisition, an agent becomes increasingly
sensitive to the entailed virtual traces and tendencies in the thick
here-and-now.
CONCLUSION
We propose four measurable sensorimotor structures that corre-
spond to four different kinds of SMCs. Each of these structures
presents various relevant regularities. These regularities, we sug-
gest, are the “laws” or “rules” of SMCs that form the basis of the
sensorimotor theory of perception. We have kept our definitions
quite general and have not said much about important issues –
such as introducing distinctions between modalities – to try, in
the first instance, to establish the widest possible theoretical base.
In spite of their generality, three of our SMCs definitions have
been shown to be useful in explaining the behavior of a dynamical
model of visually guided categorization. The fourth can easily be
explored in extensions of this model.
Although alternative or new kinds of SMCs may be possible, we
believe that at least these four have shown their potential, at once
proving the points that a clear operational definition of SMCs can
be provided, filling in a gap in the existing literature, and that the
concept is not unitary, as might have been thought.
The dynamical definitions have also been useful for an ini-
tial examination of differences in aspects of temporality, agent
involvement, and types of plasticity, as well as for drawing sharper
theoretical demarcations between the sensorimotor and ecolog-
ical perspectives on perception. Their roles in our model reveal
that ideas such as mastery or know-how of SMCs allow dynamical
interpretations that do not necessarily call forth more traditional
representational stories, thus lending support to a more radically
embodied understanding of the sensorimotor approach.
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APPENDIX
DETAILS OF AGENT AND ENVIRONMENT
The model agent introduced in Section “A Minimal Model: Cate-
gorical Perception” can move along a one-dimensional and wrap-
around environment (see Figure 1). The environment extends
over 1 (arbitrary) unit in space, and the agent’s maximum velocity
is 1 unit per second. Within this environment, the agent is pre-
sented with visual stimuli in the form of two bell-shaped curves
of different widths w (0.03 and 0.08), defined by the following
Gaussian equation:
E
(
p
) = h · e (p − x)2
2w2
here h is the height of the shape, x the position of its peak,
and ±w corresponds to the maxima of the function’s derivative,
i.e., to the inflection points where its slope is steepest. Values of
the Gaussian function are truncated to 0 beyond |x |> 10w for
reasons of computational efficiency. From trial to trial the two
shapes are presented in random horizontal positions while observ-
ing a minimum guaranteed separation. They also vary in height
(0.13± 50%), but such that within each trial their height is equal.
The sensor S measures the proximity of the Gaussian shape to
the agent’s position (shortest distance, i.e., in the direction directly
ahead of the agent):
s = S (e) = 1− dmax − e
(
p
)
dmax
,
where dmax is the maximum distance between the agent and the
shapes (where the Gaussian approaches 0. Sensor values therefore
range from 0 where the shape is flat to 1 where the vertical distance
between the shape and the agent is zero.
The controller of the agent consists of a small (2-node)
continuous-time, recurrent neural network (CTRNN). Each node
in this network is governed by the equation
τi y˙i = −yi +
∑n
j=1 wji σ
(
yj + θj
)
where y i is the activation of node i, τi its time constant, w ji the
strength of the connection from node j to i, θj a bias term, and σj
the logistic activation function. One of the nodes (a in Figure 1)
receives as input the time-derivative of sensor reading s as an
additional term in the equation. The other node (m) delivers con-
tinuous motor commands. Its output is remapped to the range
[−1, 1] and specifies directly the velocity of the agent (to the left
or to the right depending on the sign).
In terms of the general variables introduced in Section “Four
Kinds of SMCs,” environmental states e are described in this simu-
lation model by the Gaussian functions describing the two shapes:
e= E(p), where the body configuration p is simply the agent’s
horizontal position. The sensor S transforms environmental vari-
ables e into sensory state s= S(e), the time-derivative of which
serves as input to the neural network. The agent’s internal state a
corresponds to the vector representing the activity of the neural
network’s hidden node (a in Figure 2) and motor neuron. The
latter ultimately drives motor commands m, which here corre-
spond to the sigmoided output of the neuron (m in Figure 2) that
specifies the agent’s velocity.
The parameters of the agent’s neural controller are evolved
using a microbial genetic algorithm (Harvey, 2011), with mutation
as a random offset vector in the unit hypersphere (vector length
chosen from a Gaussian distribution,and direction from a uniform
distribution). The fitness function measures the root-mean-square
error between the position of the agent and the narrow shape’s
peak, averaged over the last two seconds of each 10 s trial. An indi-
vidual’s overall fitness is then averaged again over 100 trials of
random shape presentations.
Figure A1 (left panel) shows the ability of the best evolved agent
for generalized discrimination of shapes over a range of widths and
heights. The figure plots the agent’s fitness, i.e., the averaged dis-
tance from the peak, when presented with only one shape at a
time. Brighter shades indicate close proximity and darker shades
large distances. For the purpose of generating this picture only,
we changed the environment from circular to open-ended. In this
case avoidance of a shape always leads to the agent moving far
away from the shape, preventing cases of returning to the shape
after the first avoidance.
The figure indicates that the agent carves out a specific region
of widths and heights for which it perfectly approaches the corre-
sponding shapes, while avoiding all others. Which is to say, from
a continuum of possible shapes the agent behaviorally forms two
distinct categories. The shapes encountered during evolution are
shown as horizontal lines, and clearly fall into the two distinct
regions. Widths are not discriminated independently from height
however. As shape height increases, progressively wider shapes fall
into the “approach” category. Since the task was designed such
that shapes could only the distinguished by their steepness (but
not their absolute values), we show in the right panel the maxi-
mum slope of the bell shape (i.e., the derivative of the Gaussian
function at point w) for the same range of widths and heights.
The boundary between the two categories seems to be related to
the steepness of the shape, but shows a non-linear falloff at greater
heights.
DYNAMICAL ANALYSIS
In the dynamical analysis of the model agent’s SM habitat we
followed a two-step process determining:
1. The effect of sensory stimulation (as mapped out completely
by the SM environment for all possible agent positions and
motor commands – see Figure 3) on the steady-state of the
agent’s dynamics. Here we fix sensory stimulation at each pos-
sible value and identify the limit sets of the agent. The resulting
attractor landscape (Figure 5) can be seen as describing quali-
tatively all trajectories that can be reached by the agent for fixed
sensory values.
2. The effect of the identified attractor landscape on the subse-
quent change in sensory values.
This provides us with information about the SM habitat in the
form of (1) the effect of sensory changes on motor commands,
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FIGURE A1 | Evolved performance. Left: fitness of the evolved agent for
approach behavior with single bell shapes of varying width and height.
Higher (brighter) values are better, zero being the maximum fitness.
Horizontal bars indicate the range of shapes encountered during evolution
(widths=0.03,0.08, height=0.13+−50%). Right: maximum slope of the
bell shape (derivative of corresponding Gaussian at w) covering the same
range of width and height. Black lines trace equally spaced contours of
constant slope.
taking into account internal dynamics and (2) the effect of inter-
nally driven motors on subsequent sensor values. Together they
describe the whole loop, while taking into account the internal
dynamics. However, since this method only considers the system’s
steady states for fixed input values (which in the behaving agent
would normally be time-varying), it misses information about the
transient behavior of the system.
Starting with the qualitative description of the agent’s dynamics
as a function of its input, analysis reveals that the hidden neuron
exhibits bistable dynamics (see Figure A2), while the motor neu-
ron performs a simple rescaling of the hidden neuron’s activity.
As input to the hidden neuron increases from negative to positive
values, the neuron undergoes two bifurcations (at input levels of
b1≈ 0.67 and b2≈ 1.14). This leads to three types of qualitatively
different dynamics characterized by the appearance and destruc-
tion of a saddle-node separating two fixed-point attractors in the
mid-range of input levels.
In Figure A3 we show the two-neuron system’s phase portrait
at input levels surrounding the bifurcation points (using neural
output coordinates). The salient point here is that the system
will always tend to one of two fixed points. The first is located
around motor neuron levels of approximately 0.8, and the sec-
ond around levels of 0.4. Translated into agent velocities this
implies that the agent will always tend, in the steady state, to
either a positive velocity of 0.6 or a negative velocity of −0.2
(note the asymmetry). In the bistable regime, which of the two
attractor basins the system finds itself in, is determined by the
activity of the hidden neuron. All states smaller than the saddle-
node will tend to the positive velocity attractor, while states on
the other side of the node will move toward the negative velocity
attractor.
Next, we can show directly how these attractors (the long term
output of the neural activity for a given fixed sensory input) relate
to the SM environment illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. To do so,
we determine for all possible sensory values (given by the surface
in Figure 3 for each position and velocity) the resulting attractors
FIGURE A2 | Steady state of the hidden neuron a (y1) as a function of a
fixed input. For sensory stimulations smaller than b1 the output of the
neuron evolves toward a single point attractor (a1), the position of which
changes with the input value and is represented by a solid line). At the
exact value of b1 a saddle-node bifurcation creates a new fixed point (a2)
and a saddle node (s, dashed line). As input increases further, both
fixed-points move toward higher levels of hidden neuron activation.
Eventually, in a second (reverse) saddle-node bifurcation at b2, fixed-point a1
collides with the saddle node and both vanish, leaving only attractor a2.
of the autonomous agent system (this method has been already
applied for the dynamical analysis of minimally cognitive agents by
Beer, 2003). Of the attractor’s coordinates we plot only the equilib-
rium value of the motor neuron, as this directly affects the agent’s
behavior. The resulting surfaces for approach and avoidance are
shown in Figure A4.
Figure 5 in the main text was derived from these surfaces by
adopting a top-view and by adding the agent’s trajectories color-
coded according to the attractor the agent is tending to at each
point in time (the surfaces in the figure appear pixelated because
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FIGURE A3 | Phase portraits surrounding the bifurcation points in
coordinates of neural output. Variable o1 corresponds to the output of
hidden neuron a, and o2 to motor neuron m. Black lines show isoclines, at the
intersection of which can be found the fixed-point attractors (black dots) and
saddle node (gray dots). In light gray the flow of trajectories toward the fixed
points is shown.
FIGURE A4 | Attractor landscape of evolved agent in approach and
avoidance conditions. Steady-state motor output as a function of
fixed sensory input resulting from a motor command (velocity) at a
given position. Black attractor regions correspond to negative and white
regions to positive steady-state velocities. Gray areas indicate bistable
regimes.
FIGURE A5 | Sensorimotor habitat. Change in sensory reading as agent moves a small proportion from its initial position and velocity toward its steady-state
velocity. Bright areas indicate increased, dark areas reduced sensor values.
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the equilibria take time to process and were hence calculated only
at a certain sampling of the region).
As mentioned in Section “A Minimal Model: Categorical Per-
ception,” we can describe the SM habitat also in terms of the
sensory consequences that result from the agent acting on ini-
tial sensory perturbations for a certain period of time. A precise
method would simulate the agent starting at all possible pairs of
position and velocity and compare how sensory values change
after a given amount of time. Here we use an approximation
only. First, we calculate the sensory stimulation for all combi-
nations of initial position and commanded velocity s0= s(p0, v0).
Next, we identify the steady-state velocity vs for (constant) sen-
sory state s0 as given by the attractor landscape. We then assume
that the system relaxes toward the attractor, and hence that the
agent’s velocity will change a small proportion from v0 toward vs:
dv= (vs− v0)/k. Given this change in velocity we can calculate the
new sensor reading s1 at the new position [p0+ v0·dt, v0+ dv], and
finally calculate the change in sensor reading s1− s0. The result is
a single diagram that summarizes, in an approximate fashion, the
functional relation between sensors and motor commands while
taking into account the agent’s internal dynamics. The procedure
is informative for a sufficiently small finite change, and parameters
were chosen in accordance with the timescales of the system (in
this case, k = 0.5). For the two environmental conditions this is
shown in Figure A5.
One can see that for areas of initially negative sensory stim-
ulation (see e.g., p=−0.05, v=−0.5 in SM environment above,
Figure 4), the tendency is to move toward more positive positions
(see corresponding area in attractor landscape), and hence more
positive sensory stimulation (i.e., positive change). For positive
sensory stimulation, the tendency is to move toward more negative
values (negative change). In fact, the surface resembles a negative
image of the SM environment. One can interpret this surface as
implementing the SMC rule “if the sensor currently reports a pos-
itive value, move such as to make it more negative, and vice versa.”
Since sensor readings are also proportional to the slope of the bell
shape, this rule explains why the agent should come to oscillate
back and forth in an area where this change is small.
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